SYD-TOR(1)

NAME

syd-tor - SOCKS Proxy Forwarder

SYNOPSIS

syd-tor [-dh] -p <pid-fd> -i <socket-fd> [-o addr:port] [-u unix-sock]

DESCRIPTION

Receives listening socket from fd and forwards traffic to addr:port or UNIX socket.

External address must either be an IPv4, or an IPv6 address or path to a UNIX domain socket, defaults to 127.0.0.1:9050.

PID file descriptor is used to track the exit of Syd process.

OPTIONS

-h | Display help.
-d | Run in debug mode without confinement.
-p pid-fd | PID file descriptor of Syd process.
-i socket-fd | Socket file descriptor to receive the listening socket from.
-o ext-addr | Specify external address to forward traffic to.
 | Address may be an IPv4/IPv6 address in format "addr:port".
 | Defaults to "127.0.0.1:9050".
-u unix-sock | Specify UNIX domain socket to forward traffic to.
 | This option has precedence over -o.

USAGE

syd-tor(1) is not meant to be used as a standalone tool. Syd invokes syd-tor(1) at startup when Proxy sandboxing is set to on with "sandbox/proxy:on". See the PROXY SANDBOXING section in syd(7) manual page for more information. If you want to use syd-tor(1) in your own project, what you need to do first is to pass it a non-blocking PID fd of your own process with the "-p <pid-fd>" argument so syd-tor(1) can simultaneously exit with it. Care should be given at this stage as PID file descriptors are "O_CLOEXEC" by default. Next, create a UNIX socket-pair, enter a network namespace, bring up the loopback device, bind(2) a socket to a port on it and then send this socket file descriptor through the write end of the socket-pair with sendmsg(2) "SCM_RIGHTS" option. Finally pass the read end of the socket-pair to syd-tor(1) with the "-i <socket-fd>" argument.

IMPLEMENTATION

syd-tor(1) is designed with performance, security, and privacy in mind, utilizing advanced techniques such as edge-triggered epoll(7) for efficient event notification and full asynchronous operations to handle multiple connections without blocking. It employs zero-copy data transfer using the splice(2) system call to move data directly between file descriptors within the kernel, ensuring high performance and data privacy. To facilitate bidirectional communication, syd-tor(1) uses two pairs of pipes, allowing seamless data flow between the client and the external address. Additionally, syd-tor(1) confines its execution environment using seccomp(2) and landlock(7), restricting system calls and file accesses to minimize the attack surface. Compared to socksns, which uses the Tokio runtime for asynchronous I/O, syd-tor(1) emphasizes kernel-level efficiency and security, making it a robust solution for SOCKS proxy forwarding.

SECURITY

syd-tor(1) implements comprehensive security measures to mitigate risks associated with running outside the Syd sandbox, thus preventing potential Meddler-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks against containers. Resource limits RLIMIT_FSIZE, RLIMIT_NPROC, RLIMIT_LOCKS, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, and RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE are set to zero to prevent file/process/lock/msgqueue creation inside the main loop. seccomp(2) filters are carefully configured to allow only the required syscalls. The socket(2) syscall is limited to a single domain, type, and protocol, while connect(2) is restricted to a single memory address, preventing unauthorized network connections. sigaction(2), and rt_sigaction(2) system calls are not permitted to install new signal handlers. pipe2(2), socket(2), connect(2), accept4(2), and shutdown(2) system calls are protected by syscall argument cookies determined randomly using getrandom(2) with GRND_RANDOM at startup. Refer to the Syscall Argument Cookies section of the syd(7) manual page for more information on argument cookies. These mitigations are most effective on 64-bit architectures, but on 32-bit systems the socketcall(2) interface may be exploited. Therefore, additional protective measures are implemented. On Linux 6.10 and later, the memory area containing the external network address is sealed using mseal(2) and surrounding memory is protected with guard pages to prevent overflow or adjacent corruption. Executable memory is also disallowed to prevent code injection attacks. If available, landlock(7) and namespaces(7) impose further restrictions by disallowing all filesystem access, thereby providing an extra layer of security. The binary is also re-executed from a sealed memfd_create(2) file descriptor to guard against CVE-2019-5736. Together, these techniques ensure that even if syd-tor(1) is compromised, the scope of malicious actions is significantly limited, maintaining the overall integrity and security of the system.

ENVIRONMENT

SYD_TOR_DEBUG | Run in debug mode without confinement, equivalent to the "-d" option.
 | This is ignored unless Syd is built with the trusted Cargo feature.
SYD_TOR_RULES | Print seccomp rules in human-readable format to standard error at startup.

CAVEATS

The syd-tor(1) process runs as a single process and can potentially hit file descriptor (FD) limits due to the number of FDs it opens per connection. Each client connection involves six FDs: one for the client socket, one for the external socket, and four for the pipes used for bidirectional data transfer (two pipes with an input and output FD each). To mitigate this, syd-tor(1) sets the file-max limit to the hard limit by overriding the soft limit at startup. However, in some cases, this may not be sufficient, and manual adjustment of FD limits may be necessary.

SEE ALSO

syd(1), syd(2), syd(7)

syd homepage: https://sydbox.exherbo.org/

AUTHORS

Maintained by Ali Polatel. Up-to-date sources can be found at https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox.git and bugs/patches can be submitted to https://gitlab.exherbo.org/groups/sydbox/-/issues. Discuss in #sydbox on Libera Chat or in #sydbox:mailstation.de on Matrix.